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INTRODUCTION 
On behalf of a diverse group of organizations representing women across all 
sectors of the labor force, we are again pleased to testify before the Commission on the 
Future of Worker-Management Relations. As you know, the women's equity 
community is broad based, and represents national membership organizations, legal and 
policy advocacy groups, policy research organizations, and grass-roots groups working 
for the betterment of women. 
Our testimony today will address the third question put before the Commission 
by the Secretary of Labor: 
What (if anything) should be done to increase the extent to which work-place 
problems are directly resolved by the parties themselves, rather than through 
recourse to state and federal courts and government regulatory bodies? 
The task force of women's groups which we represent today has considerable 
experience representing women in the equal employment opportunity (EEO) process, 
and we have spent a significant amount of time and effort reviewing the subject of 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR). We have met with a number of experts, policy 
advocates, and interested individuals, read numerous fact-finding reports and other 
relevant documents, and we have explored the value of both mediation and arbitration 
as a means of alternative dispute resolution in unionized and non-unionized workplaces. 
There are three guiding principles which are essential to any acceptable system 
of alternative dispute resolution.1 First, it must provide a proper balance of power 
1
 Our testimony is limited to workplace disputes arising from unlawful employment discrimination 
based on sex, since that is the area of expertise for most of our member organizations. We would urge 
the Commission to consult other experts for their recommendations about how to strengthen public 
enforcement of laws in other areas of employment disputes (e.g. minimum wage, overtime, employee 
benefits law and the like). 
1 
between the employer and the employee. Second, accountability to society at large is 
essential for fairness to the employee and for building appropriate incentives for 
employers to institute equitable employment practices. Third, the structure of the 
system must have enough integrity and continuity to encourage use by all parties. 
We have reached two broad conclusions: (1) more effort should be put into 
enforcement of anti-discrimination laws and into prevention of discrimination and its 
attendant complaints, and (2) the reason for the continuing growth in employment 
complaints merits extensive, serious review by this Commission since it places a 
substantial burden on all parties involved and also directly impacts the mission(s) of a 
number of public enforcement agencies. 
Finally, we have determined that ADR, particularly in a private, non-union 
context, is too complex to fully explore in a short period such as the Commission's 
current life. We recommend that the Commission continue its exploration of ways to 
resolve conflict in the workplace with emphasis on enhancing the public systems that 
are already in place. We support public agency, private employer, union, and public 
interest sector collaboration on these issues. We believe it is important that advocates 
for women, who are now the majority of Americans, be included in any continuing 
exploration of these issues. We believe we can make a valuable contribution, and we 
would like to be included in any continuing work or working group on ADR. 
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ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
L Prevention of complaints fhrough removal of the cause of complaints should be the 
first priority of the Commission in addressing dispute resolution. 
We believe that the question of dispute resolution can best be addressed by first 
looking at how to prevent workplace disputes. Insofar as female employees are 
concerned, these disputes most often center around sex discrimination in hiring, 
discharge, pay and promotion, and on sexual harassment, including hostile working 
environments. Enforcement agencies, most especially the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), have a large backlog of cases and are presently 
lacking both staff and funding necessary to effectively deal with the ongoing flood of 
complaints. Therefore prevention of complaints should be a priority for the 
Commission, taking precedence over ways to deal with resolution of complaints once 
they occur. v 
To date, the Commission has given insufficient attention to the fact of 
discrimination in the workplace, focusing instead on inconvenience to the employer in 
dealing with non-meritorious cases. While we acknowledge that some non-meritorious 
cases are inevitable in a nation of more than 128 million workers, we ask the 
Commission to remember that the greatest source of discrimination complaints is 
discrimination. Indeed, on page 20 of the Fact Finding Report, the Commission finds 
that after such factors as work experience, industry differences or occupation are taken 
into account there still remains an "unexplained residual gap" in pay between women 
and men in any given labor market category. Most studies acknowledge that a large 
pan of this "unexplained residual" is due to sex discrimination.2 J Similarly, the 
2
 Women, Work, and Wages: Equal Pay for Jobs of Equal Value. Donald J. Trieman and Heidi 
Hanmann, eds. National Academy Press, Washington, D.G 1981. 
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Commission refers to sexual harassment as an "interpersonal issue." Sexual harassment 
is indeed interpersonal, but it is a violation of civil rights laws and should be given the 
serious attention such illegal conduct deserves. 
There are a number of lines of inquiry the Commission can pursue and steps the 
Commission can recommend that would reduce the incidence of discrimination, and 
thereby reduce the incidence of formal complaints. 
Recommendations: 
1. Give employees easier access to unions. Much previous testimony has been directed 
at ways to increase access to union representation for employees. We believe this is 
crucial for decreasing the level of conflict in the workplace, thereby decreasing the 
number of complaints. The Commission correctly points out that public opinion surveys 
have long made it clear that most Americans approve of unions in general and the right 
of employees to join a union, and that women often express a greater preference for 
unionization than men. The Commission finds that only 45 percent of nonunion firms 
have some form of employee grievance procedure, in contrast to 98 percent of all 
unionized firms, and further finds that "in most workplaces with collective bargaining, 
the system of labor-management negotiations works well. Conflict is relatively low, and 
unions and firms have developed diverse forms of cooperative arrangements."4 This 
being the case, one way to increase conflict resolution by the parties themselves rather 
than by recourse to court proceedings and regulatory bodies is to increase the number 
of workplaces in which employees are represented by unions. The fact of union 
representation apparently increases the employer's incentive to settle disputes, and 
' Pay Equity: Empirical Inquiries. Robert T. Michael, Heidi Hartmann, and Brigid OTarrell, eds. 
National Academy Press, Washington, D.C 1989. 
4
 Fact Finding Report. Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, VS. 
Department of Labor, May, 1994, p. 64. 
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increases the likelihood that the employee complaint will be settled to the employee's 
satisfaction long before litigation is necessary.5 
Further, many unions have negotiated effective EEO and affirmative action 
programs and/or have secured significant discrimination "remedies" - e.g., wage rate 
adjustments for women's jobs, integration of seniority lines, job posting and expanded 
training opportunities - through collective bargaining and other concerted activities. 
These achievements reflect both the prophylactic effect of unionization in averting 
individual and class claims of unlawful discrimination, and also the effects of creating a 
more equitable balance of power for the employee - leveling the playing field. 
The Commission correctly points out that it is increasingly difficult to write and 
enforce standard regulations that fit well with a workforce containing many part time 
and contingent workers, and small employers with 15 or fewer workers who are not 
covered by the EEOC. We have testified previously as to the importance of giving 
these workers access to representation and protection of existing laws. Indeed, any 
conflict resolution scheme that can be devised is meaningless to workers who have been 
"defined out" of the system by virtue of their non-standard employment arrangements, 
or the size of their workplaces. 
2. Remove the caps on damages for sex discrimination in the 1991 Civil Rights Act by 
passing the Equal Remedies Act now before Congress. The 1991 Civil Rights Act contains 
caps on damages that may be awarded to employees who have proved gender and 
certain other types of discrimination. These caps have the effect of establishing a "fee 
schedule" for discrimination. Employers can continue discriminatory practices that save 
them money (but cost employees) for years before a complainant is successful in 
J
 While no one knows for sure bow many grievances are bandied by unions in a year, one of the 
most reliable estimates comes from Lewin and Peterson (The Modern Grievance Procedure in the 
United States. 1986), indicating that the number is somewhere between 7 and 11 million. 
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proving discrimination. When these savings are balanced against a known fine, 
particularly if combined with the low probability of successful litigation by employees, 
the expected value of discrimination becomes higher than the expected value of the fine. 
In other words, it is cheaper to discriminate and pay an occasional fine of known 
amount (a mere cost of doing business) than to correct the discriminatory practices.' 
If there were no caps on damages for discrimination, prevention of discrimination 
might become the most cost-beneficial alternative for employers. To use a simple 
analogy, you and I are less likely to park illegally if we know the fine is $150 instead of 
$5. In the Commission's own words "The prospect [of six or seven figure awards] does 
serve as a deterrent to improper management decisions. . .*• 
3. Make enforcement of existing laws tougher. It is generally recognized that the anti-
regulatory environment of the 1980s produced an atmosphere of lax enforcement of 
employment laws. Some employers undoubtedly responded to this environment with 
decreased attention to practices that lead to worker complaints, particularly where no 
union was present to monitor such activities. Just as employers are less likely to 
discriminate if they know they will be punished, some may actually increase 
discriminatory activity if they know that agencies lack enforcement resources. 
That existing structures for enforcement of the EEO laws do not work well is no 
accident or mystery. Although there have been increases in the number of complaints 
due to additional jurisdictions, existing structures do not work because they were 
* The damages caps in the 1991 Civil Rights Act work a particular disadvantage on women and 
disabled workers, whose federal remedies are limited to those in Title VII and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, as amended by the 1991 CRA. African-Americans have causes of action under the 
post-Civil War statutes, which do not include damages caps. 
7
 Fact Finding Report. Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, U.S. 
Department of Labor, May, 1994, p. 113. 
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deliberately undermined with a starvation of resources and by specific policies that 
created non-enforcement at both the EEOC and the OPCCP. Likewise, the means of 
repairing the problems at these agencies is no mystery. By increasing resources devoted 
to enforcement activities, increasing the number of enforcement staff, and changing 
enforcement policies to increase class actions and other aggressive enforcement tools, 
these agencies can be turned around. Agency changes are discussed at length in section 
HI. 
4. Require increased disclosure of employment statistics. Employees now suffer from an 
information imbalance. Employers are able to learn virtually everything about the 
employee, including credit records, traffic tickets, smoking behavior, past salaries and 
health information. Employees often cannot get the most basic information about 
employment practices, such as number of females in a given job classification or 
average salary levels for different job classifications. This information imbalance 
directly addresses the Commission's question as to how thev level of trust and quality of 
the relationships among workers, labor leaders, managers, and other groups in society 
ar.d the workplace can be enhanced. 
On page 126 of the Fact Finding Report, the Commission makes the seemingly 
unsupported statement that as much, if not more, of legal expenditures in employment 
disputes are borne "by law-abiding employers defending themselves against non-
meritorious claims and going through all the internal procedures and paperwork needed 
to demonstrate compliance" as are borne by guilty employers. Disclosure of relevant 
employment statistics would surely cut down on conflict and litigation. Exactly what 
form these statistics should take is beyond the scope of this testimony, but even low-
level disclosure such as an expanded EEO-1 form recommended by the GAO in 1981* 
* Further Improvements Needed in EEOC Enforcement Activities. HRD-81-29, United States 
General Accounting Office, April 9, 1981. 
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showing the number of males and females by race and ethnicity in each job category 
along with wage data in each would be valuable. As it stands now, employees who 
suspect discrimination in pay or promotion, for example, have no way to know whether 
their fears are unfounded. With proper statistics readily available, potential plaintiffs 
could see whether their claims would likely be successful. The same statistics could be 
used by potential defendants to monitor their own practices and avoid inequities that 
could lead to complaints and litigation. Disclosure requirements such as these are 
contained in the Fair Pay Act (HH. 4803) now before Congress. 
We agree with the Commission that employees can play a valuable role in 
enforcing the laws when properly trained, equipped, and organized. But for employees 
on the job to be in a good position to monitor whether their employers are complying 
with the government's standards and engaging in fair employment practices, they must 
have sufficient information. 
IL In equal employment opportunity disputes that cannot be prevented, the 
government's role should be to facilitate enforcement of laws and quick resolution with 
a publicly administered system; an option to consider is publicly administered voluntary 
ADR through existing enforcement agencies. We do not recommend, and indeed would 
oppose the Dunlop Commission's proposing at this time that any new, private, system 
for resolving employment disputes be created, or establishment of any mandatory public 
system of ADR. 
We believe statements in the Commission's Fact Finding Report support this view: 
Employment law, [in contrast to labor law] focuses on issues that are felt to be 
sufficiently vital to the body politic not to leave to private negotiations - whether 
individual or collective. Some such concerns are directly financial: (e.g. what are 
the minimum wages that should be paid to people at work (under FLSA), and 
what must be done to insure the value and security of retirement income 
8 
promised for the future (under ERISA)). But as described above, many 
employment laws tend to focus on value-laden issues like racial and gender 
discrimination, occupational hazards, privacy invasions, and the like. Public 
policy holds that all employees have equal protection against denial of their 
lights in these areas, whatever their (or their employer's) market power.' 
. . .these laws created public rights that could not be waived or altered by private 
agreement, and they entrusted interpretation and enforcement of the law's terms 
to a body selected by and accountable to the broader community, not the parties 
to an immediate dispute.** 
The women's equity and civil rights communities have fought for 30 years for 
the protections afforded by our employment laws and the public agencies to administer 
and enforce those laws. Indeed, it was only with the enactment of the 1991 Civil 
Rights Act that victims of on-the-job sex discrimination became entitled under federal 
law to have their cases heard by juries, and to seek compensatory and punitive damages 
in some cases. 
The fact that the mechanism for enforcement has been starved for lack of 
resources and deliberately undermined by explicit policies while having enforcement 
responsibility significantly increased does not serve as evidence that a new system 
should be created, but rather that existing systems should be given the resources to 
function effectively. 
There is now a disturbing trend in non-unionized employment settings in which 
employees are being coerced into signing pre-employment binding arbitration 
agreements under which they must submit all future employment-related disputes, even 
Title VII discrimination claims, to arbitration rather than go to court The Supreme 
* Fact Finding Report, p. 109. 
M
 Fan Finding Report, p. 116. 
Court decision in Gilmer" has spurred usage of this practice in the securities industry 
(in which Gilmer arose) as well as in other industries. Moreover, when an employee 
has agreed to such a pre-employment prospective waiver of her rights, she must also 
abide by the terms of arbitration, such as who selects the arbitrator and the procedures 
of the hearing that the employer established in the pre-employment agreement. This is 
particularly alarming when taken with the finding by the General Accounting Office that 
approximately 89% of arbitrators used in the securities industry in 1992 were white men 
with little experience in labor law.12 
Critics say this procedure privatizes the civil rights of complainants, and we 
agree. The Commission's own finding in citing the Lewin study of grievance procedures 
in non-unionized settings reinforces the view that private ADR is a perilous course for 
employees.13 The study found that senior management usually made the final 
judgment about whether to uphold or reverse the personnel decisions being challenged 
by an employee, and that nonunion employees faced significant risks in their future 
prospects with the firm if they took issue with their supervisor's action through such a 
review process. 
We have other significant concerns about the effect of private, non-union ADR 
on employees' ability to vindicate their EEO rights, even in cases where it is not 
compelled as a condition of employment ADR practitioners (arbitrator, mediator, 
ombudsman, or other) may experience undue influence in deciding cases, particularly 
11
 Holding that an employee could be required to waive the right to sue for age discrimination 
and be required to submit his complaint to binding arbitration as a condition of employment 
u
 "Arbiters of Bias in Securities Industry Have Slight Experience in Labor Law," The New York 
Times. April 5, 1994. 
u
 Fact Finding Report, p. 116 citing David Lewin, •Grievance Procedures in Nonunion 
Workplaces: An Empirical Analysis of Usage, Dynamics, and Outcomes," 66 Chicago-Kent Law Review 
828, 1990. 
10 
where their livelihood depends on being rehired by the employer. Because many lack 
substantive knowledge of anti-discrimination law, legal issues and statutory rights may 
get lost in compromise: 
- . Basic due process protections, such as notice, at least some right to discover 
information about the employer's case, and the right to have the outcome of 
arbitration reviewed by a court where appropriate, may not be afforded the 
employee. 
- The ADR practitioner may not award or take into account the full remedies 
available under law, such as compensatory and punitive damages now 
available under Title VII. This deprives victims of discrimination of the 
remedies to which they may be entitled and dilutes the deterrent value of the 
law. 
- The employee may not be allowed to be represented by an attorney or other 
representative in the ADR proceeding. 
- An employee may feel pressured into agreeing to submit her claim to ADR 
because she wants to mitigate the animosity that her filing the claim created 
in her working environment - or, simply, because the extreme difficulty in 
retaining an attorney or in getting the EEOC or other public agency to 
respond makes her believe that ADR is her best alternative. 
- Companies may use the system in bad faith as a barrier to justice for the 
employee. For example, the complainant may find herself having to prove 
that the arbitration procedure is biased before she can proceed to the next 
step, placing an additional barrier in the way of resolution. Or, the 
employer's incentive may be to reduce legal fees and awards, not to obtain a 
quick resolution of the dispute. Finally, the employer may attempt to 
retaliate against an employer who attempts to vindicate her rights, and the 
ADR system may be ill-equipped - or not equipped - to deal with such 
retaliation. 
- The process is almost always private, with no written decision, thus no public 
censure or accountability. 
- Employers may simply refuse to comply with the terms of the settlement, and 
employees' avenues for enforcement may be limited or non-existent 
11 
We strongly oppose expanded use of mandatory arbitration in the equal 
employment opportunity law context The Supreme Court recognized twenty years ago, 
in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, the preeminent role of federal courts in determining 
issues of liability and relief under Title VII, and the general unsuitability of the arbitral 
procedures for resolving discrimination disputes. Gilmer notwithstanding, nothing has 
changed in the nature of arbitration since Gardner-Denver that renders arbitration a 
more suitable vehicle for resolving discrimination disputes. The government should 
never give its imprimatur to employers to coerce individual workers, particularly women 
workers who are not protected by a union, to choose between agreeing to ADR and 
their jobs. 
Certain situations, such as some class actions or cases bearing on significant 
policy questions or that may have precedentia] value, are especially Hi-suited to ADR in 
any context, and should not be subject to ADR. 
Recommendation: 
We support, and recommend that the Commission support, legislation similar to the 
bills recently introduced by Representative Schroeder and Senator Femgold that make it 
illegal for employers to obtain voluntary or involuntary arbitration agreements before a 
dispute arises and that makes unenforceable pre-dispute arbitration agreements to resolve 
employment discrimination claims. 
12 
IH Public systems exist far enforcement of employment law, and these system have the 
potential to greatly reduce the number of workplace complaints as well as facilitate the 
handling of complaints that do arise. Unlike private ADR systems in non-union 
settings, these systems have both accountabinry and continuity . 
We have identified a number of promising avenues for innovation using public 
sector systems that are already in place with specific mandates to prevent discrimination 
in the workplace and resolve disputes that arise, and we know that this list is not 
exhaustive. We urge the Commission to investigate these and other avenues and, in 
doing so, to formally solicit the views of those agencies whose jurisdictions and missions 
are implicated by the Commission's proceedings. Specifically, the Commission should 
further explore: 
1. Increasing the amount and specificity of information submitted on the EEO forms, such 
as including wages by employment category, gender, and race,
 K This could cut down on 
non-meritorious complaints and cause employers to engage in management practices to 
prevent discrimination. It has long been recognized that EEO forms are insufficient to 
detect sex and race discrimination, particularly in pay. As stated previously, the GAO 
recommended expansion of EEO-1 as long ago as 1981 to facilitate enforcement14 
Such reporting would impose no additional burden on employers, since compensation 
records are already kept and no business is ignorant of what its employees are paid. 
2. Devoting resources at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to targeting 
systemic discrimination and bringing class actions, thereby reducing the number of 
workplace violations and attendant complaints. The EEOC has now had 30 years of 
experience with workplace discrimination and discrimination complaints, and the agency 
knows which practices indicate likely violations. 
14
 Further Improvements Needed in EEOC Enforcement Activities. HRD-81-29, United States 
General Accounting Office, April 9, 1981. 
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If Commissioner's charges could be filed based on testing or on probable 
violations after reviewing the EEO-1 forms and other compliance information, 
employers could be confronted with their own numbers and motivated to change 
discriminatory practices. In addition, EEOC should conduct random audits of 
employers not covered by federal contract compliance obligations to investigate such 
employers independent of specific individual complaints. Increased use of technology 
would facilitate this process and help the agency deal with repeat violators; computers 
now allow the EEOC to detect employers with a history of complaints. 
Additional resources should also include systemic follow-up of conciliation 
agreements, court orders, and consent decrees. There is currently no system for 
monitoring these agreements, therefore no data on final outcomes. Compliance should 
be monitored beyond dollar settlement payments (Le. Have employment and workplace 
conditions changed as a result of these actions?). 
3. Instituting mechanisms for collaboration and cooperation between agencies. Employers 
who are violating the law in one area (such as wages or safety) may be violating the 
law in other areas. Reviews and enforcement actions by other agencies (e.g. OSHA or 
the Wage and Hour Division) are likely to turn up information that suggests a review of 
the employer's fair employment practices is in order. For example, while inspecting a 
work site where there is exposure to toxic chemicals, the OSHA inspector may note 
that there are no women - is this because the employer has excluded all women of 
childbearing age, a clear violation of Title VII? 
4. An improved quick-response system for tracking cases and case disposition. 
Restructuring the charge processing system and eliminating the backlog are critical to 
an effective EEOC Based on our experience with charge processing and our review of 
the GAO report concerning the "rapid-charge" system that was used in the past, we 
14 
believe an improved quick-response system for tracking cases and case disposition 
should be investigated, particularly in light of technology now available. 
5. More aggressive public education programs. One example of public education would 
be EEOC and other EEO enforcement agencies instituting high-profile public relations 
campaigns to inform the public of awards paid by companies that have been found to 
discriminate. In addition to strong enforcement efforts, the agencies should also insure 
through aggressive public education that employers know their obligations and 
employees know their rights under EEO laws. 
6. Continue to experiment with and evaluate alternative methods of resolution of EEOC 
charges. One example is the EEOCs pilot mediation program in which certain claims 
of discrimination are handled through mediation prior to the EEOCs investigating those 
claims.15 Other options such as the establishment of an in-house arbitration service 
(for use on a voluntary basis) at the EEOC should be investigated, since one of the 
most difficult issues to deal with in private ADR is possible bias on the part of 
arbitrators, and the inherent power imbalance that comes from the employer hiring the 
ADR practitioner directly. These uses of ADR may well be beneficial to employees -
by providing them with less costly, quicker, and more accessible methods for resolving 
their disputes with their employers. Before any such programs are made permanent, 
however, they must be evaluated carefully to insure that charging parties are not 
receiving lower average backpay awards than charging parties not participating in such 
programs. 
u
 To date, this is a relatively small program. According to data we have received, only 920 cases 
were considered appropriate for mediation through this program (compared to a total yearly intake 
EEOC intake of over 80,000 cases). Both the employer and employee agreed to mediation (a 
precondition for mediation to go forward in this program) in only 34 percent of the 920 cases; of those, 
jusi over half (1S6) were resolved through mediation and the other half were returned to the usual 
EEOC process. 
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7. Increasing funding for and use of city, state and county cM and human rights 
commissions. Such fair employment practice bodies, which are usually established by 
law or ordinance and may be funded in part through grants from the EEOQ allow 
citizens access to a publicly administered grievance procedure in employment 
discrimination cases. Many cases are resolved during the investigation process before a 
hearing takes place, and because the final hearing is public, the respondent has an 
incentive for quick resolution.- Indeed, it is common for Commissions to resolve cases 
within 180 days of the complainant's filing." The entire investigation remains on the 
local level, so employees are not subjected to the federal court system which mav be 
intimidating. 
8. At the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, the new, aggressive 
enforcement policy that has recently been put in place should be reinforced with steps such 
as dramatically increasing its enforcement staff (down over 50% from its level 14 years 
ago), and expanding the sanctions that the OFCCP can impose on contractors that 
violate the Executive Order to include debarment for a minimum fixed term, 
withholding of progress payments, and remedial monetary sanctions. 
Recommendation: 
We recommend that Congress appropriate sufficient funds for public agencies to 
function in accordance with their mandates to end employment discrimination. 
Recognizing that the government must operate in a fiscally responsible manner, such 
appropriation would save billions of dollars lost by employees to discriminatory practices, 
and save a like amount in litigation costs for both employees and employers. 
u
 Eighty percent of the cases before the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) in the 
state of New York are settled in mediation. Source: Richard Curreri, Office of Conciliation, PERB, 
Albany, New York, personal communication. 
17
 Dr. James McClellan, Director of the Alexandria, Virginia Human Rights Commission, personal 
communication. Ninety percent of Alexandria's case load is employment discrimination cases. 
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IV. Since private companies are free to create alternative dispute resolution systems as 
they choose, it is important that basic protections be mandated for employees when 
such systems sire created and used, and mat abuses in such systems be sharply curbed. 
We believe that employees pursuing EEO claims through such systems should be able 
to preserve their right to seek redress through legal channels should private ADR mfl 
to safeguard their rights. 
Any dispute resolution system relied upon or subject to review by an 
enforcement agency such as the EEOC should have built-in procedures for monitoring 
outcomes, to ensure not only that these safeguards are met but also that the agency's 
mission to end employment discrimination is fulfilled. Specifically, the EEOC should 
ensure that ADR-participating employers that discriminate unlawfully are properly 
deterred from continuing to discriminate, and that ADR-participating employees that 
are the victims of discrimination receive appropriate relief." 
In the matter of constructing a workable and fair private non-union ADR system, 
we beueve the inherent power imbalance between the employee and employer may be 
a fatal flaw. For example, there is no obvious solution to the question of who pays for 
the services of the ADR practitioner. If the employee is required to pay an equal 
share with the employer, the cost may be prohibitive. If the employer is required to 
pay the full share or even most of the cost, the practitioner may be biased in favor of 
the deeper pockets of the employer. Similar problems arise in the question of who 
chooses the ADR professional, and by what method. 
There are other substantive safeguards that should be required of any private 
ADR system used for EEO complaints: 
u
 For example, the EEOC should regularly monitor the average back pay and other awards for 
charging parties in ADR and compare it to the average for charging parties not in ADR, to evaluate 
the two systems and to ensure that those in ADR are getting a "fair shake.* 
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- All forms of ADR must be fully voluntary for both parties. We strongly 
oppose expanded use of mandatory arbitration in the EEO law context 
Employers should not be able to coerce individual workers, particularly 
women workers who are not protected by a union, to choose between 
agreeing to ADR and their jobs. We thus support making it illegal for 
employers to obtain voluntary or involuntary arbitration agreements before a 
dispute arises, and making unenforceable pre-dispute arbitration agreements 
to resolve employment discrimination claims. 
- The ADR practitioner must have and apply substantive expertise in the 
substantive law at issue (such as equal employment opportunity law); 
arbitrator errors of law should always be reviewable grounds for the employee 
to challenge the ADR outcome. 
- Arbitrators should be authorized to give (and other ADR practitioners should 
consider) all of the remedies available under law, including punitive and 
compensatory damages, and their failure to award or include in the 
negotiations the possibility of such damages should be grounds for overturning 
the ADR agreement 
- Employees must be given the opportunity to be represented by counsel or 
other representatives (e.g. unions, women's advocacy, civil rights groups); 
those who are not so represented must be given sufficient information about 
the law, remedies, and their rights to make informed choices, and sufficient 
time to consider the information to determine whether to go forward. 
- The importance of a neutral decision-maker cannot be overstated, and judicial 
review of the outcome of. any ADR should always be available to challenge a 
biased decision-maker or process. 
- To protect against the inherent bias of the ADR practitioner stemming from 
the "repeat user"" problem, especially in non-union settings, the employee 
should always have a role equal to that of the employer in choosing the ADR 
practitioner. 
- Basic "due process" concerns such as notice and access to relevant informa-
tion, and additional circumstances in which judicial review is appropriate, 
must be addressed before arbitration should be enforceable. 
" Where ADR practitioners may knowingly or unknowingly exhibit a bias in favor of the employer 
in order to be hired in the future. 
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Recommendation: 
To protect against abuse and to safeguard the rights of the employees who are using 
ADR, we urge the Commission to propose adoption of a series of limitations on ADR, 
whenever it is used in the EEO context. If resolution of a case through ADR does not 
contain these safeguards, it should be unenforceable. These safeguards should be adopted 
by Congress and used by the EEOC and other enforcement agencies to evaluate privately 
arrived at settlements of employment discrimination disputes. 
CONCLUSION 
We have determined that ADR, particularly in a private, non-union context, is 
too complex to fully explore in a short period such as the Commission's current life. 
We recommend that the Commission continue its exploration of ways to resolve conflict 
in the workplace with emphasis on enhancing the public systems that are already in 
place. We support public agency, private employer, union, and public interest sector 
collaboration on these issues. We believe it is important that advocates for women, 
who are now the majority of Americans, be included in any continuing exploration of 
these issues. We believe we can make a valuable contribution, and we would like to be 
included in any continuing work or working group on ADR. 
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